

Public Health Then and Now

Globalization, States, and the Health of Indigenous Peoples

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ABSTRACT

The consequences of globalization are mixed, and for the indigenous peoples of poor countries globalization has potentially important benefits. These are the result not of participation in the global economy but of participation in global networks of other indigenous peoples, environmental activists, and non-governmental organizations. Since World War II, nonstate actors such as these have gained standing in international forums. It is indigenous peoples' growing visibility and ability to mobilize international support against the policies of their own national governments that has contributed in some important instances to their improved chances of survival (*Am J Public Health*. 2000;90:1531–1539)

Both historically and in the contemporary world, it is generally the case that states dominate indigenous peoples. They may displace or eliminate them, integrate them into the state, or make them pay tribute. It does not seem to matter what form of government controls the state. In this respect, at least, capitalist and communist, authoritarian and democratic governments all tend to behave similarly. Most times, tribal peoples' contacts with the state are to their great disadvantage.¹ One measure of disadvantage is health status (mortality and fertility, rates of population growth or decline, morbidity).

In this article I shall be concerned primarily with the impact of Europeans on the indigenous peoples of the Western Hemisphere, Oceania, and the Russian Far East. Historians have often claimed that these peoples melted away at first contact as a result of epidemics of infectious diseases introduced by Europeans.² Elsewhere I have argued that while epidemics were indeed important, the contact situation itself, especially the extent of warfare and dispossession, was at least as significant in shaping the demographic and epidemiologic response to European contact.³ Here I will build on these debates by taking a historical view of events in the present.

I should like to argue that now as in the past, states have dominated indigenous peoples primarily for purposes of their own economic growth. As high and stable levels of economic development have been achieved in some nations, however, the tendency has been for them to pursue increasingly benign—or at least less malign—policies with regard to their aboriginal citizens. In a global context, this raises the question of whether relatively poor and weak states⁴ in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the former Soviet republics are likely to improve their policies toward tribal peoples only after they themselves have advanced economically.

My argument is that there is no assurance that all countries will benefit equally, or that some will benefit at all, from the global economy that has emerged since World War II. Indeed, many skeptics, of whom I am one, be-

lieve that globalization may have profoundly deleterious effects on some states and may well increase inequality among them.⁵ The erosion of sovereignty may mean that states cannot protect their industries and local employment; that laws protecting the environment and the health and safety of workers are weakened; that social spending is reduced; and that national economies are controlled by the flow of international capital. Nonetheless, there may also be benefits from globalization, including benefits for indigenous peoples in poor countries.

The Adverse Influence of States on Indigenous Peoples

Wherever there is evidence in the contemporary world, indigenous people who have been incorporated into the state have lower life expectancy, lower income, and worse health than the nonindigenous inhabitants of the same state. Table 1 shows the life expectancies of indigenous and nonindigenous citizens of 3 Anglophone countries in the 1990s.⁶ Life expectancies of the nonindigenous populations of these countries differ from each other by about 2 years, with no obvious relationship to gross national product (GNP) per capita. Similarly, there is no obvious relationship between GNP per capita and the life expectancy of indigenous people in each country. Maoris in New Zealand, the poorest of these 3 countries, have a life expectancy only slightly lower than that of American Indians, in the richest country, whereas the life expectancy of Aboriginal

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TABLE 1—Life Expectancy of Indigenous and Nonindigenous Peoples in Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, Early 1990s

Country	GNP per Capita, \$ ^a	Life Expectancy, y	
		Indigenous	Nonindigenous
Australia ^b	18000	60.4	77.7
New Zealand ^c	13350	70.5	76.3
United States ^d	25880	71.1	75.5

^aIn 1994 US dollars. *Source.* World Bank, *From Plan to Market: World Development Report 1996* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1996).

^b*Source.* W. McLennan and R. Madden, *The Health and Welfare of Australia's Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples* (Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1997).

^c*Source.* Eru Pomare Maori Health Research Centre, *Hauora: Maori Standards of Health III: A Study of the Years 1970–1991* (Wellington South, New Zealand: Wellington School of Medicine, 1995).

^dCorrected for misclassification of race. *Source.* *Indian Health Trends and Services* (Rockville, Md: Indian Health Service, 1996).

Australians is by far the lowest of the populations under consideration. Elsewhere I have tried to account for these patterns, and I shall not do so again here.⁷ The point I wish to make is that in each country, the life expectancy of indigenous people is substantially less than that of nonindigenous people.

Comparable data from Latin America are not as widely available, and space limitations prohibit a detailed account of the data that do exist, but what evidence there is indicates that in Latin America as well, indigenous people are significantly more disadvantaged and have significantly lower life expectancies than nonindigenous people.⁸ Recent ecologic studies in Guatemala and Mexico, for example, indicate that regions with a high proportion of Indians have higher mortality rates than those with lower proportions of Indians.⁹ In Guatemala in 1994, with a GNP per capita of US \$1200, life expectancy was 63.8 years in departments with 70% or more indigenous population and 68.6 years in departments with less than 70%. Life expectancy for the total population was 65.6 years. In Colombia in the early 1990s, when GNP per capita was US \$1670, the life expectancy of indigenous peoples was about 56.5 years, compared with about 70 years for the population as a whole.¹⁰

The data from the Americas and Oceania described above reflect not only the results of government policies but differences among indigenous peoples themselves, some of whom were (and are) hunter-gatherers and others of whom were agricultural peoples living in a variety of more or less complex social systems. To control some of the variation, I show in Table 2 data from one type of population, the Inuit (or Eskimos), who live under 4 different political regimes. Clearly, among both the Inuit and the nonindigenous peoples of the 3 high-income countries, there is no obvious association between GNP per capita and life expectancy at birth. In the Russian Federation, however, income is low, as is the life expectancy of both the Inuit and the total population.¹¹

All the data I have been able to find suggest that, with the striking exception of Australia, indigenous people in rich countries tend to have higher life expectancies than indigenous people in poor countries.¹² The per capita incomes of indigenous peoples are undoubtedly important, but they are not entirely adequate to explain this phenomenon. For example, Maoris have much lower incomes than American Indians but virtually the same life expectancy. Another part of the answer is that high national wealth is associated with changes

TABLE 2—Life Expectancy (y) of Inuit and Nonindigenous Populations in 4 Countries

	Inuit	Nonindigenous
Greenland, 1989–1993	64	75
Canada, 1990s	67	77
Alaska, 1990s	67	75
Chukotka, ^a 1990s	56	67

^aFormer Soviet republic.

Source. P. Bjerregaard and T.K. Young, *The Circumpolar Inuit: Health of a Population in Transition* (Copenhagen, Denmark: Munksgaard, 1998), 50.

in values and policies in important segments of the dominant society, changes that encourage recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples to some level of autonomy, control of land, and access to social and health services. It is to those changes in values and policies that I now turn.

Economic Growth and Postmaterialist Values


There is good evidence from several national and cross-national studies of a strong positive correlation between income and what Inglehart has called postmaterialist values. He writes:

[E]mphasis on economic security and on physical security will tend to go together . . . those who feel insecure about these survival needs have a fundamentally different outlook and political behavior from those who feel secure about them. The latter are likely to give top priority to nonmaterial goals such as self-expression, belonging, and intellectual or aesthetic satisfaction.¹³

Postmaterialist values are associated with tolerance of differences, with environmentalism, and with education and income. The correlation between income and postmaterial values is high and positive at the ecologic level of analysis, whether countries or provinces within countries are the units, as well as at the individual level. Figure 1 illustrates this relationship, using data from the 43 nations in the World Values Survey.

Postmaterialists take for granted material well-being and economic and physical security. Thus they feel free to develop their aesthetic and intellectual interests and to concern themselves with matters of lifestyle and quality of life. They are secure enough to tolerate—indeed, to value—cultural diversity. Moreover, because most postmaterialists are urban, they are not likely to be involved in conflicts over access to natural resources. On the contrary, they value the environment for its aesthetic, recreational, and other nonextractive uses.¹⁴

Moreover, economic advancement is associated with increased numbers of, as well as increased membership in, voluntary associations representing a wide variety of interest groups. The reason appears to be that economic growth is associated with increasing educational levels, occupational specialization, and the emergence of service and information industries that tend to be relatively egalitarian in organization and to value innovation. There are compelling cross-national data showing that such organizational characteristics have a profound impact on individual values such as autonomy,¹⁵ as well as on patterns of political participation. Traditional organizations—such as churches, unions, and political parties—



Source. R. Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).

FIGURE 1—Postmaterial (PM) values regressed onto gross national product (GNP) per capita, 43 countries in the World Values Survey.

weaken, and issue-specific organizations become increasingly common.¹⁶ Figure 2 shows the association between rate of organizational membership and GNP per capita in 35 of the 43 countries included in the World Values Survey.¹⁷ The correlation is strong and positive, but it is clear that a lot of the variance is left unexplained.

There has been some debate about whether the existence of such associations promotes or retards economic development.¹⁸ For the present purposes, what is relevant is that a positive correlation exists between per capita income and organizational membership, and that economic expansion seems to promote the proliferation of such organizations, whether or not they themselves promote expansion of the economy. In economically advanced states, such organizations tend to be widespread, to form dense networks, and, in many instances, to have a significant impact on government policies in their areas of concern. Some are organizations that concern themselves with environmental and indigenous issues, and they have been very influential. The organizational expression of aesthetic, environmental, and cultural values, and the impact of this expression on government policy with regard to indigenous people, is illustrated by the American experience.

Indian Policy, Postmaterial Values, and Voluntary Associations in the United States

From the time of first contact between Europeans and the native peoples of the Western Hemisphere in the late 15th and 16th centuries, European views of indigenous people have been ambivalent. The natives were savages, either idealized as noble or excoriated as degraded, but always savages. In English America, the Puritans' view was dominant: America was a wilderness filled with threatening savages. The wilderness was to be transformed into a garden, and the savages—agents of Satan—were to be overcome and expelled.¹⁹ There were always those whose view differed, of course, for example, Bartolomé de las Casas in Latin America in the mid-16th century²⁰ and various missionaries and anti-slavery organizations elsewhere in the Americas in the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries.²¹ Nonetheless, until the turn of the 20th century, defense of the rights of indigenous peoples to their own land and to the preservation of their cultures was relatively feeble.

In the United States, it was during the Progressive Era, roughly from 1880 through 1920, that the situation began to change significantly. Conservation became a major force in Amer-


ican political life,²² born of the perception that Americans were destroying their patrimony by ruthlessly exploiting their natural resources and environment. These perceptions were embedded in a larger view of the consequences of industrialization, immigration, and urbanization, all of which had accelerated since the end of the Civil War.

The response to these changes on the part of many urbanites was a desire to return to nature, without, of course, giving up the advantages of city life.²³ The creation of national parks; the planning of city parks and playgrounds; the development of suburbs; the emergence of country clubs and the growing popularity of golf, hunting, and fishing as gentlemen's sports; the establishment of summer camps and organizations such as the Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts; the craze for bird-watching—all were part of the back-to-nature movement. Much of this trend represented an elitist response on the part of well-to-do WASPs (White Anglo-Saxon Protestants) who felt overwhelmed and threatened by hordes of immigrants.²⁴ It was made possible by the unprecedented expansion of the economy in the decades following the Civil War. That is to say, economic development had created both intolerable conditions of urban crowding and blight and the possibility and means of escape. The conservation movement and the protection of the rights of Indians must be seen against this background.

The perception that Indians were part of the wilderness heritage that needed to be preserved is generally traced to George Catlin, who in the 1830s was the first to call for the creation of a national park where wilderness, wildlife, and Indians would be protected.²⁵ Subsequently, both Henry David Thoreau and John Muir were much influenced by their extensive contacts with Indians and Alaskan Natives.²⁶ The same was true for many other conservationists and naturalists, John Wesley Powell, Mary Austin, Aldo Leopold, Robert Marshall, George Bird Grinnell, Gifford Pinchot, Ernest Thompson Seton, Luther Gulick, and John Collier among them.²⁷

In one way or another, these conservationists and naturalists thought that Indians lived in harmony with nature in a way that Euro-Americans had long since forgotten. Indeed, during the Progressive Era Indians came to represent a way of life from which industrial society had to learn if it was to survive. Organizations such as the Camp Fire Girls, as well as many summer camps, included much Indian lore and ritual in their activities. For many, no doubt, this was simply play, but for many others it meant far more. John Collier wrote:

[I]nto the Camp Fire Girls' ritual and daily life they [Luther and Charlotte Gulick, the



Source: R. Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).

FIGURE 2—Membership (cumulative percentage of citizens belonging to 16 types of associations) in voluntary associations regressed onto gross national product (GNP) per capita, 35 countries in the World Values Survey.

founders] wove a symbolism authentic and rich and profound. The symbolism was that of the Amerindians—of the only ethnic group in America which knew and used adolescence as the gateway and endless road to the union of man with man, man with earth, and man with the cosmic mystery.²⁸


Collier himself was one of the most important embodiments of the link between conservation, the idealization and protection of American Indians, and the importance of voluntary associations in influencing public policy. He was commissioner of the Bureau of Indian Affairs from 1933 until 1945, during the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt. He had been an activist in social reform in New York City in the first 2 decades of the century. In the early 1920s he became involved in the protection of Indian land rights and the fight against assimilationist policies, and he remained involved in Indian affairs until his death in 1968. His account of his first contact with American Indians, in Taos, NM, at Christmastime in 1920, draws together his vision of Indians and their harmony with the land:

The discovery that came to me there, in that tiny group of a few hundred Indians, was of personality-forming institutions, even now unweakened, which had survived repeated and immense historical shocks, and which were going right on in the production of states of mind, attitudes of mind, earth-loyalties and human loyalties, amid a context of beauty that suffused all the life of the group.²⁹

Collier was not unique in this respect. Van Wyck Brooks pointed out that during the first 2 decades of the 20th century the Southwest came to play for others the same role it did for Collier. He wrote:

One might almost have foreseen at the turn of the century the days of Mabel Dodge Luhan and her circle, who realized in a sense what Mary Austin longed for, and the New Mexican literary movement in which various American writers were touched by the rhythms of Indian verse and thought. Mabel Dodge Luhan was a type of those who were soon to turn away from the “wearily external white world,” as D. H. Lawrence called it—who felt that the white man was “spoiled” and “lost” and who wished to throw off a civilization that was buried under accretions of objects, invented or collected.

The Progressive Era was also the time when social work and academic social science were just emerging as occupational specialties and when there was still much contact between nascent professionals in these fields and artists, writers, and journalists who supported progressive reforms of all sorts: in municipal government, in education, in conservation and management of natural resources, and in immigration policy, to name but a few areas. Among the vehicles for reform were voluntary associations, each advocating its own special cause.³¹



Source: *Figaro* (Queensland), August 6, 1887, 225. Reproduced with permission from Analysis of Visual Images Web site, University of Newcastle, Australia. Copyright 2000, Ross Woodrow.

Figure 3—“Nature and Civilisation.”

This was an old pattern, but never was it more true than during the so-called organizational revolution of the Progressive Era.³² And it was as true of the conservation movement as of any other, for the movement spawned many organizations, including the Sierra Club, the Izaak Walton League, and the Audubon Society. It was also true in social reform more generally. The organizations with which Collier worked or cooperated through the early 1930s included the National Playground Association, the National Conference of Community Centers, the Committee on Public Education, the Gramercy Park Community Clearing House, the National Conference of Social Work, the Greater New York Community Council, the Child Health Organization, the General Federation of Women's Clubs, the National League for Constructive Immigration Legislation, the Boy Scouts of America, the Camp Fire Girls, The California League for American Indians, the Indian Rights Association, the New Mexico Association on Indian Affairs, the Eastern Association on Indian Affairs, the National Popular Government League, the League for Political Education, the American Indian Defense Association, and the Wilderness Society.³³

The network of conservationists seems to have been more exclusively WASP in the first half of the 20th century than was the world of Indian rights protection, though the two overlapped to a considerable degree. Members of each group tended to be urban, well-to-do, and from the East and West Coasts rather than from the South, the Midwest, or the West.³⁴ Because they were well-to-do and well connected, they were often able to influence elected and appointed government officials. And because so many of the supporters of Indian rights were writers and journalists, or friends and relatives of journalists, they were also able to place articles in prominent national and local publications and thus influence public opinion.³⁵

Thus, by the beginning of the 20th century, the economic development of the country had created sufficient wealth that a substantial class of professionals, managers, artists, and writers had emerged. These were people who were in a position to espouse values and implement policies that did not entirely reject development itself—for their livelihoods were dependent on it—but that rejected much of the human and environmental degradation that had been created as a result of unregulated development. And much of what they espoused became policy during the New Deal.

Some years after completing his term as commissioner of Indian Affairs, Collier wrote,

The Indian New Deal held, with mature consciousness, two purposes. One was the conservation of the biological Indian and of the Indian cultures, each with its special genius.

The other purpose was the conservation of the Indian's natural resources—the pitiful remnant of what had been their vast land—their vast land conserved by them through ten thousand years.³⁶

Indeed, environmental conservation and public and personal health services were central to New Deal Indian policies.³⁷ These policies have received mixed reviews from historians and were always contentious enough that their survival was never assured.³⁸ Nonetheless, the reforms inspired by the Progressives and implemented during the New Deal did leave an important legacy, for they helped legitimate Indian claims to land, to health and social services, and to a special relationship between Indian tribal governments and the federal government. And they have had a beneficial effect on the health of American Indians.³⁹

Moreover, many organizations founded in the United States during the Progressive Era, and the causes they espoused, have become international since World War II. Two examples will suffice. John Collier, after leaving the Bureau of Indian Affairs, became increasingly involved with organizations concerned with the protection of the rights of indigenous peoples throughout the Americas.⁴⁰ And an elite conservation organization, the Sierra Club, has broadened its membership base and been transformed into an environmental organization concerned with global issues. Similar transformations have occurred in other advanced industrial nations, so much so that by the end of the 20th century there had come into existence international networks of environmental and human rights groups whose influence has been felt on the streets of Seattle, in the corridors of international organizations in Washington, DC, and Geneva, and in the Amazon rainforest.⁴¹

The Paradox of Globalization

The definition of globalization that I use here is more than “[t]he increasing integration of world capital and trade flows.”⁴² Globalization is, as well, “[a] social process in which the constraints of geography on social and cultural arrangements recede and in which people become increasingly aware that they are receding.”⁴³ This definition does not imply increasing cultural, political, or economic homogeneity. Indeed, globalization is every bit as likely to create heterogeneity. It is a process that has accelerated substantially since World War II, so much so that it is qualitatively and quantitatively different from what happened in the previous several centuries.⁴⁴

For well over a century economic historians have engaged in what they have called the standard of living debate. The op-

timists argue that the industrial revolution was worth the suffering that some experienced because in the long run everyone has benefited, even if some have benefited more than others. The pessimists argue that the results of the industrial revolution were inequitably distributed and that some segments of the population suffered disproportionately and continue to suffer unfairly, even though their deprivation may be relative rather than absolute. Some of the arguments about globalization are very similar. The optimists believe that a rising tide will lift all ships; the pessimists believe that there will be growing inequalities, with the North enriching itself while large segments of the South fall farther behind.

There is little doubt that historically, globalization has resulted in improved health—at least as judged by life expectancy—for people in both rich and poor countries, although in recent decades there has been deterioration in some parts of the world. It has had a similar effect on economic growth: since the early 19th century, there has been an increase worldwide in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, although rates of growth have been very different. Thus, although incomes have increased worldwide, it is also true that there was greater income inequality among nations and regions in the 1990s than at any time since 1820, and presumably earlier. Moreover, since 1980 there has been a significant decline in GDP per capita in Eastern Europe, and stagnation and some decline in Latin America and Africa.⁴⁵

The widening of income differences among regions, and the actual downturn in income in some, is congruent with the decline of life expectancy in some Eastern European and African nations. And both absolute and relative decline in income do not bode well for indigenous peoples in poor countries. For indigenous people stand in the way of exploitation of the natural resources that poor countries must undertake in order to participate in the global economy and raise their standard of living. They also stand in the way of the resettlement of large populations of poor non-indigenous people seeking new land. The process is occurring with lethal effects in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, and Brazil, to name but a few of the largest countries.

It is not my intention to recite the history of contact between these states and their indigenous peoples. The point I wish to make is that these governments are doing what others have done before them, often with the same catastrophic effects. Globalization as we have known it since World War II is not a new cause of dispossession. Dispossession is an old phenomenon. What is new is the increasingly effective resistance to dispossession on the part of local indigenous and international actors.

In Brazil, for example, where the situation has been particularly well publicized, Rebeiro, a Brazilian anthropologist, estimated in 1957 that the Indian population had declined over the previous half century from about 1 million to less than 200,000. "In areas of agricultural expansions, six aboriginal tribes became extinct. In areas of pastoral expansion (cattle raising), thirteen tribes disappeared. In areas of extractive activities (rubber and nut collecting, diamond prospecting, etc.), a phenomenal fifty-nine tribes were destroyed."⁴⁶

Despite these losses, in 1957 there were still 120 tribes in the Amazon basin. They were, for the most part, isolated, and they lived by hunting, fishing, and gardening. In the 1960s, following the military coup, government policy began to focus on Amazonia. There had long been international interest in the resources in this region. The country's new military leadership capitalized on that interest. Davis has written that the military worked a "global transformation in the Brazilian mining sector [that] reflected the new symbiosis that, on the national level, had emerged between the military government and a number of large multinational corporations."⁴⁷

But it was not only multinational corporations that were involved in the development of Amazonia. US government agencies such as the Agency for International Development and the US Geological Survey provided expertise and sponsorship for mineral exploration,⁴⁸ and international lending agencies such as the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank provided capital. Projects involved not only mining but highway and dam construction, cattle ranching, and farming on large tracts cleared from the forest.

The rain forest turned out to be ecologically far more fragile than had been supposed, and the result of all these development activities has been ecologic destruction that has attracted world attention.⁴⁹ The Indians who stood in the way of development were also largely destroyed. Within a decade or two of first contact, epidemics of measles, tuberculosis, and other infectious diseases had begun to spread among them.⁵⁰ Prospectors, ranchers, the military, and hired killers murdered large numbers. Destruction of hunting, fishing, and farming areas contributed to malnutrition and outright starvation among the Indians. Price wrote:

Estimates of Nambiquara population at the turn of the century run as high as 20,000; in 1938 the surviving population was estimated at 2,000 to 3,000; in 1959 at 1,500; and in 1969, at 600. The population according to the first real census, taken in 1975, was 534. The death rate for the part of the tribe that I had been able to keep track of from 1969 to 1975 was 60 per thousand, while the birth rate was 45 per thousand. Average life expectancy at birth was twenty-three years.⁵¹

Describing the result of a 3-year gold rush in the late 1980s in part of Amazonia, Rabben observed that 65% of the indigenous population was infected with malaria, whereas before the rush malaria had been rare. "Among the Yanomami 35 percent were malnourished, and 76 percent were anemic; 13 percent of children lost one or both of their parents." Dispersion of the survivors, coupled with high death rates, "devastated Yanomami culture and dis-aggregated Yanomami society in many areas."⁵²

These ecologic and human catastrophes have been facilitated by international capital, expertise, and markets—that is to say, by globalization. The rapidity with which the calamity has occurred is remarkable, but the process is not so different from, and no more rapid than, what occurred in settler societies of the past.⁵³ What is very different is that there have been witnesses who have reported it internationally in great detail.⁵⁴

At least as remarkable is the reaction to these global forces. Advocacy groups and networks of associations, themselves examples of globalization of a noneconomic sort, "promote causes, principled ideas, and norms, and they often involve individuals advocating policy changes that cannot be easily linked to a rationalist understanding of their 'interests.'"⁵⁵ I refer to the proliferation of national and international indigenous organizations, to the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that work with them and that helped to create them, and to the skill with which many indigenous individuals and groups have learned to use the media, the Internet, fax machines, and inter-

national forums to advance their cause. There are numerous examples, of which I mention only a few.⁵⁶

In Brazil, according to Ramos, "[I]ndigenous peoples . . . have been experimenting with various forms of organization, albeit backed up by nonindigenous support groups."⁵⁷ Different forms of organization emerged in the 1980s and 1990s. In the early period, one national organization (the Union of Indigenous Nations, or UNI) was tried, but it failed to sustain itself. In the present decade, there has been fragmentation. There are "30 support groups run by whites, both lay and religiously oriented, [and] there are now no less than 109 indigenous organizations."⁵⁸

There have been significant achievements, including "the demarcation of a large and continuous land reserve and the participation of indigenous leadership in key positions of municipal government," but "[r]acism and impunity, the two principal villains, constantly tear away at the heart of victories." Repeated and increasing acts of aggression have been "committed against indigenous peoples: murders of leaders, massacres, epidemic diseases caused by neglect of official health agencies, illegal detentions, and police brutality."⁵⁹ Nonetheless, indigenous and supportive non-indigenous organizations and individuals have had an impact on slowing if not reversing private and government incursions.⁶⁰

In Mexico, the ability of Indians in Chiapas and their supporters elsewhere to call world attention to their grievances has reduced the government's use of armed force. In this



FIGURE 4—The people of Pantelho, Chiapas, Mexico, call these mud and thatch houses home. The women in the photo are engaged in collecting firewood, water, preparing food, and caring for their children. Few of the homes in Pantelho have such "luxuries" as electricity or running water. (Courtesy of Pete Brown.)

conflict, as in many others, the use of the Internet—what has been called Netwar—has made visible abuses that in previous centuries would have gone largely unremarked.⁶¹

The representation of indigenous and non-indigenous organizations and individuals in such forums as the International Labor Organization, the Organization of American States, the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, and the United Nations has also proved important. World Bank policy has evolved over the past several decades toward greater safeguards of the land and natural-resource rights of indigenous peoples in projects supported by bank funds.⁶² It has been recommended that the bank give “greater attention to national and international legal definitions and to consultations with governments, regional and national indigenous organizations, NGOs and academic experts.” These policies are also meant to have an impact on private sector investment and development.⁶³

In the United Nations (UN), too, increasing attention has been paid to the rights of indigenous people. Increasingly since the founding of the UN, there has been an extension of international law to include nonstate actors.⁶⁴ The creation of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations is one manifestation of this development. Signatory nations to UN and other treaties and conventions (e.g., International Labor Organization conventions 107 [1957] and 169 [1989], which recognize the rights of indigenous peoples as peoples⁶⁵) acknowledge that they will abide by the international rules to which they have agreed, including, for example, rules protecting human rights. When they violate those agreements, individuals and groups often bring the violations to the attention of the UN. This is one of the ways in which the Working Group on Indigenous Populations has attempted to publicize violations of the rights of indigenous peoples.⁶⁶

It is of symbolic importance that the UN declared 1993 the Year of the World’s Indigenous People and 1994 through 2003 the Decade of the World’s Indigenous People. Rigoberta Menchu, a Guatemalan Indian, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1992. And indigenous people often invoke the World Health Organization’s definition of health when claiming the right to community control of health services, for they assert that such a holistic definition is more in accord with their concepts than with the reductionism of Western biomedicine.⁶⁷

In addition to claims before the UN and other international organizations are more highly visible representations of indigenous peoples. The Kayapo in Brazil have had the support of the popular singer Sting.⁶⁸ There have also been demonstrations meant to draw public attention to the injustices suffered by indigenous peoples without antagonizing the audience they mean to attract.⁶⁹ Norwegian

Saami hunger strikes, the Aboriginal tent embassy on the lawn of the old Parliament House in Australia, the Trail of Broken Treaties in the United States, demonstrations by Kayapo warriors in Brazil, the threat of demonstrations by Aborigines at the 2000 Olympics in Sydney—all are meant to be media events (“ethnodrama,” one writer has termed them) to draw national and international attention to grievances with which many nonindigenous people can sympathize and which they will wish to rectify. This has been called the politics of embarrassment, embarrassment of national governments in the eyes of the world.

The health consequences of these activities are hard to assess, but it seems likely that there has indeed been a growing recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples, which, in the best-publicized cases at least (e.g., in Brazil and other Latin American countries), may be having an impact on their survival. In countries where international scrutiny has been less penetrating—India, Bangladesh, China, the Russian Federation, Indonesia (until recently)—the situation is far less clear.

There are other consequences as well. Of his experience as an Australian Aboriginal representative to the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Dodson wrote:

I was sitting in a room, 12,000 miles away from home, but if I’d closed my eyes I could just about have been in Maningrida or Doomadgee or Flinders Island. The people wore different clothes, spoke in different languages or with different accents, and their homes had different names. But the stories and the sufferings were the same. We were all part of a world community of indigenous peoples spanning the planet; experiencing the same problems and struggling against the same alienation, marginalization and sense of powerlessness. We had gathered there united by our shared frustration with the dominant systems in our own countries and their consistent failure to deliver justice. We were all looking for, and demanding, justice from a higher authority.⁷⁰

Involvement in international forums, collaboration with international NGOs whose aim is to universalize the struggles of indigenous peoples, use of the Internet to facilitate communications and create informational Web sites—all are ways in which indigenous groups around the world are becoming increasingly aware of other peoples in similar situations and are mobilizing international public opinion on their own behalf. This, too, is a manifestation of globalization, and it has led not to homogenization, but to the assertion of tribal and ethnic identity and increasing claims for autonomy, and thus to differentiation.

Conclusion

Critics of globalization point to the weakening of nation-states as one of its worst con-

sequences. For example, the World Trade Organization, often operating beyond public scrutiny, has the power to enforce economic policies governing a wide variety of activities without democratic consultation with the affected peoples,⁷¹ and structural adjustment programs have had profoundly deleterious effects in many poor countries. Indeed, it is argued, “Weak states is precisely what the New World Order, all too often looking suspiciously like a new world *disorder*, needs to sustain and reproduce itself. Weak, quasi-states can be easily reduced to the order required for the conduct of business, but need not be feared as effective brakes on the global companies’ business.”⁷²

Such criticisms have much to recommend them, but they are also reminiscent of the 19th-century criticism of the transformation of *gemeinschaft* into *gesellschaft*.⁷³ The growth of the nation-state at the expense of local communities in the 19th century is analogous to the growth of global corporations and quasi-governmental organizations at the expense of the nation-state now. Just as the destruction of local communities by national governments was said to result in mass society, alienation, and the breakdown of local cultures, so globalization is said to result in the destruction of nation-states by supranational organizations and in the growth of a world culture of consumerism driven by the mass media. But the emergence of nation-states also resulted in greater freedom for many people and in the destruction of rigid and often oppressive local hierarchies. That is to say, the consequences of the transformation were mixed, and so too are the consequences of globalization. Some nation-states weakened by globalization may become less responsive to their citizens and less democratic, as many writers have suggested; others, especially poor countries, may be forced to become less oppressive.

To the degree that the latter happens, it will be due in large part to the emergence internationally of the same process that has occurred in wealthy countries: the growth of NGOs that attempt to influence international policies to advance agendas involving protection of the environment and of indigenous peoples. Just as it was well-to-do people from the East and West Coasts of the United States who first attempted to protect the environment and American Indians, it is now pressure groups in the rich countries of the North who are trying to protect the environment and indigenous peoples of the poor countries of the South, where economic development is seen as a pressing necessity.

This is especially important in the face of the growing relative and absolute economic inequalities among regions and nations, for poor nations have especially strong incentives to make use of the resources to which their indigenous peoples lay claim. In the absence of

international pressure, their governments will have the same free hand to destroy indigenous peoples as states before them have had. Globalization, then, may provide part of an answer to the destruction that states have visited upon indigenous peoples. It has the potential, incompletely realized, to create both an audience for the airing of injustices that have threatened the very survival of indigenous peoples and a means of redress. □

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Endnotes

1. J. H. Bodley, *Victims of Progress* (Menlo Park, Calif: Cummings Publishing Co, 1975); R. B. Ferguson and N. L. Whitehead, *War in the Tribal Zone: Expanding States and Indigenous Warfare* (Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press and University of Washington Press, 1992); D. Maybury-Lewis, *Indigenous Peoples, Ethnic Groups, and the State* (Boston, Mass: Allyn & Bacon, 1997); R. J. Perry, *From Time Immemorial: Indigenous Peoples and State Systems* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996).
2. For example, W. H. McNeill, *Plagues and Peoples* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1979); A. W. Crosby, *Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900–1900* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
3. S. J. Kunitz, *Disease and Social Diversity: The Impact of Europeans on the Health of Non-Europeans* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1994).
4. For a definition of state capacity, see A. Brysk, *From Tribal Village to Global Village: Indian Rights and International Relations in Latin America* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2000), 107–108.
5. See, for example, J. Mander and E. Goldsmith, eds. *The Case Against the Global Economy and for a Turn Toward the Local* (San Francisco, Calif: Sierra Club Books, 1996); M. Koivusalo and E. Ollila, *Making a Healthy World: Agencies, Actors and Policies in International Health* (London, England: Zed Books, 1997).
6. Canada is not included, because I have been unable to find Canadian data from the 1990s.
7. S. J. Kunitz, "Indigenous Health: Lessons From the United States" (lecture presented at the annual meeting of the Royal Australasian College of Physicians, Perth, Western Australia, May 12–14, 1999; to be published in the proceedings of the conference).
8. G. Psacharopoulos and H. A. Patrinos, *Indigenous People and Poverty in Latin America: An Empirical Analysis* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1994). See also *Health in the Americas,*

- vol 1 and 2, scientific publication no. 569 (Washington, DC: Pan American Health Organization, 1998); Kunitz, *Disease and Social Diversity*, 16–17.
9. J. Sepúlveda, ed. *La salud de los pueblos indígenas en México* (Mexico City: Secretaría de Salud E Instituto Nacional Indigenista, 1993); Alfredo Mendez Domínguez, Centro de Estudios de Población, Universidad del Valle de Guatemala, e-mail communication, June 23, 1999.
10. M. Pineros-Petersen and M. Ruis-Salguero, "Aspectos demográficos en comunidades indígenas de tres regiones de Colombia," *Salud Pública de México* 40 (1998): 324–329.
11. Y. Slezkine, *Arctic Mirrors: Russia and the Small Peoples of the North* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994).
12. The life expectancy of indigenous people in Colombia may in fact be about the same as that in Australia, although definitional and data problems make precise comparisons hazardous. M. Almey, E. T. Pryor, and P. M. White, "National Census Measures of Ethnicity in the Americas," in *The Peopling of the Americas*, proceedings of the annual meeting of the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, Veracruz, Mexico, 1992, vol 3, 5–22.
13. R. Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 109–110.
14. Whether anti-slavery advocates and advocates for the rights of native peoples before the early 19th century shared these values is not at issue here.
15. M. Kohn, *Class and Conformity: A Study in Values*, 2nd ed. (Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press, 1977). See also M. L. Kohn, A. Naoi, C. Schoenbach, C. Schooler, and K. M. Slomczynski, "Position in the Class Structure and Psychological Functioning in the United States, Japan, and Poland," *American Journal of Sociology* 95 (1990): 964–1008.
16. Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization*, 170–171.
17. The rate is defined as the cumulative membership of citizens in each of 16 types of organizations, from labor unions with the largest number to peace organizations with the least. Intermediate levels of membership are found in religious organizations, sports and recreational organizations, educational and cultural organizations, political parties, professional associations, social welfare organizations, youth organizations, environmental and conservation organizations, health volunteer organizations, community action groups, women's organizations, Third World development organizations, animal rights organizations, and peace organizations. See Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization*, 226.
18. Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization*, 225. See also "Politics in Brief: Ex Uno, Pluro," *Economist*, August 21, 1999, 44–45.
19. R. F. Berkhofer Jr. *The White Man's Indian: Images of the American Indian from Columbus to the Present* (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), 80–84.
20. L. Hanke, *Aristotle and the American Indians: A Study in Race Prejudice in the Modern World* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1959).
21. R. K. Hitchcock, "International Human Rights, the Environment, and Indigenous Peoples," *Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law* 5 (1994): 1–22. See also T. L. Haskell, "Capitalism and the Origins of the Humanitarian Sensibility," parts 1 and 2, *American Historical Review* 90 (1985): 339–361, 547–566.

22. R. Nash, *Wilderness and the American Mind* (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1967); S. P. Hays, *Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1968).
23. P. J. Schmitt, *Back to Nature: The Arcadian Myth in Urban America* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1969).
24. E. D. Baltzell, *The Protestant Establishment: Aristocracy and Caste in America* (New York, NY: Random House, 1964); K. Jackson, *Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1985).
25. O. D. Schwarz, "Plains Indian Influences on the American Environmental Movement: Ernest Thompson Seton and Ohiyesa," in *The Struggle for the Land: Indigenous Insight and Industrial Empire in the Semiarid World*, ed. P. A. Olson (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990), 276. That the relationship between Indians and the National Park system has been highly problematic is made clear in R. H. Keller and M. F. Turek, *American Indians and National Parks* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1998).
26. R. F. Fleck, *Henry Thoreau and John Muir Among the Indians* (Hamden, Conn: Archon Books, 1985); R. F. Sayre, *Thoreau and the American Indians* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977).
27. At a later date, the same was true of Stewart Udall, William O. Douglas, and Sigurd Olson. S. Fox, *John Muir and His Legacy: The American Conservation Movement* (Boston, Mass: Little, Brown & Co, 1981), 350. Schwarz, "Plains Indian Influences," 275–276.
28. J. Collier, *From Every Zenith: A Memoir* (Denver, Colo: Sage Books, 1963), 97. See also Schwarz, "Plains Indian Influences," 282.
29. Collier, *From Every Zenith*, 126.
30. V. W. Brooks, *The Confident Years: 1885–1915* (New York, NY: Dutton, 1955), 361–363. See also C. Lasch, *The New Radicalism in America, 1889–1963* (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1967); S. J. Kunitz, "The Social Philosophy of John Collier," *Ethnohistory* 18 (1971): 213–229.
31. In the 1830s, Tocqueville observed, "Whenever, at the head of some new undertaking, you see the Government in France, or a man of rank in England, in the United States you will be sure to find an association." A. de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, vol 2, book 2, chap 5 (New York, NY: Schocken Books, 1961).
32. E. W. Hawley, *The Great War and the Search for a Modern Order, A History of the American People and Their Institutions, 1917–1933* (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, Inc, 1979), 8–9.
33. See L. C. Kelly, *The Assault on Assimilation: John Collier and the Origins of Indian Policy Reform* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1983). See also K. R. Philp, *John Collier's Crusade for Indian Reform 1920–1954* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1977).
34. Fox, *John Muir*, 351; Nash, *Wilderness*, 96. This is still the case, as an analysis of congressional voting patterns in the 1970s and 1980s suggests. See S. P. Hays, *Beauty, Health, and Permanence:*

- Environmental Politics in the United States 1955–1985* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 40–43.
35. See, for instance, Kelly, *Assault on Assimilation*, 233–237.
 36. Collier, *From Every Zenith*, 236.
 37. The importance of conservation was such that Robert Marshall, founder of the Wilderness Society, was chief of forestry for the Bureau of Indian Affairs for several years in the 1930s. Public and personal health services, too, were important elements of Indian Bureau activities. S. J. Kunitz, *Disease Change and the Role of Medicine: The Navajo Experience* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); R. A. Trennert, *White Man's Medicine: Government Doctors and the Navajo, 1863–1955* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1998).
 38. Philp, *John Collier's Crusade*, chap 11; G. D. Taylor, *The New Deal and American Indian Tribalism: The Administration of the Indian Reorganization Act, 1934–45* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1980); S. J. Kunitz, "The History and Politics of Health Care for American Indians and Alaska Natives," *American Journal of Public Health* 86 (1996): 1464–1473.
 39. Kunitz, *Disease Change*; Kunitz, *Disease and Social Diversity*; Kunitz, "History and Politics of Health Care."
 40. See, for example, Collier, *From Every Zenith*, part 5. See also Philp, *John Collier's Crusade*, 206. One of the organizations that Collier had supported even while he was commissioner of Indian Affairs, the Inter-American Indian Institute, in the late 1960s became the base from which dissident Mexican anthropologists launched a reexamination of "their own professional role and [a] critique [of] the official tradition of paternalistic Mexican *indigenismo* itself." Brysk, *Tribal Village to Global Village*, 64.
 41. D. Ronfeldt and C. L. Thorup, *North America in the Era of Citizen Networks: State, Society, and Security*, paper P-7945 (Santa Monica, Calif: Rand Corp, 1995).
 42. "Politics in Brief," 11.
 43. M. Waters, *Globalization* (London, England: Routledge, 1995), 3.
 44. D. Held, A. McGrew, D. Goldblatt, and J. Perraton, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1999).
 45. A. Maddison, *Monitoring the World Economy 1820–1992* (Paris, France: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1995), 21.
 46. S. H. Davis, *Victims of the Miracle: Development and the Indians of Brazil* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 5.
 47. Davis, *Victims of the Miracle*, 82.
 48. Davis, *Victims of the Miracle*, 89.
 49. See, for example, D. J. Mahar, *Government Policies and Deforestation in Brazil's Amazon Region* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1989).
 50. Davis, *Victims of the Miracle*, 99–101.
 51. D. Price, *Before the Bulldozer: The Nambiquara Indians and The World Bank* (Cabin John, Md: Seven Locks Press, 1989), 37.
 52. L. Rabben, *Unnatural Selection: The Yanomami, the Kayapo and the Onslaught of Civilisation* (London, England: Pluto Press, 1998), 95. The situation is complex, however. The population history of the Ache of Paraguay indicates that after an initial catastrophic loss of population during the period of early contact with Europeans, when about 30% of the population perished, life expectancy increased and is better now than it was in the "forest period" before contact. "The Ache are aware that death rates are lower on reservations than prior to contact and emphasize this as a benefit of having given up their forest lifestyle. If mortality during the first two years of life could be decreased to about 3%, the Ache population would have a life expectancy at birth of around sixty years and a mortality profile that differs little from those of other rural populations in developing countries around the world." K. Hill and A. M. Hurtado, *Ache Life History: The Ecology and Demography of a Foraging People* (New York, NY: Aldine De Gruyter, 1996), 194.
 53. D. Denoon, *Settler Capitalism* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1983); Crosby, *Ecological Imperialism*.
 54. A. R. Ramos, *Sanuma Memories: Yanomami Ethnography in Times of Crisis* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), 311.
 55. M. E. Keck and K. Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 8–9. Among the most profound aspects of globalization is the proliferation of international non-governmental organizations since World War II. In 1909 there were 176 such organizations; in 1951, 832; and in 1996, 5472. Held et al., *Global Transformations*, 53–57. Because definitions vary, there may in fact be almost twice as many as the number given for 1996. See Union of International Associations, "Types of International Organization" (<http://www.uia.org/uiadocs/orgtypea.htm>) and "International Organizations by Year and by Type 1909–1996" (<http://www.uia.org/uiastats/stybv296.htm>). Among these organizations are advocacy groups for a variety of causes, such as human rights (33 in 1953, 168 in 1993), international law and peace (25 in 1953, 85 in 1993), the environment (2 in 1953, 90 in 1993), and ethnic unity and group rights (10 in 1953, 29 in 1993). See Keck and Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*, 11.
 56. G. Urban and J. Sherzer, eds., *Nation-States and Indians in Latin America* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991), 9. For many more examples, see Brysk, *Tribal Village to Global Village*.
 57. A. C. Ramos, "The Indigenous Movement in Brazil: A Quarter Century of Ups and Downs," *Cultural Survival Quarterly* (summer 1997): 50.
 58. Ramos, "Ups and Downs," 53.
 59. R. M. Wright, "Violence on Indian Day in Brazil 1997: Symbol of the Past and Future," *Cultural Survival Quarterly* (summer 1997): 47–49.
 60. M. Benavides, "Amazon Indigenous Peoples: New Challenges for Political Participation and Sustainable Development," *Cultural Survival Quarterly* (fall 1996): 50–53; Rabben, *Unnatural Selection*, 16. See also Urban and Sherzer, *Nation-States and Indians*, 9; A. R. Ramos, *Indigenism: Ethnic Politics in Brazil* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1998), 102–115.
 61. D. Ronfeldt, J. Arquilla, G. E. Fuller, and M. Fuller, *The Zapatista Social Network in Mexico* (Santa Monica, Calif: Rand Corp, 1998).
 62. S. Davis and E. Bermudez, *Technical Consultation Approach Paper for Revision of OD 4.20 on Indigenous Peoples. Summary of Proceedings* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 29 October 1998).
 63. S. Davis, S. Salman, and E. Bermudez, *Approach Paper on Revision of OD 4.20 on Indigenous Peoples* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998).
 64. S. Pritchard, "The Significance of International Law," in *Indigenous Peoples, the United Nations and Human Rights*, ed. S. Pritchard (London, England: Zed Books, 1995), 3.
 65. *Seeds of a New Partnership: Indigenous Peoples and the United Nations* (New York, NY: United Nations, 1994), 49.
 66. For example, Mick Dodson, an Australian Aboriginal representative to the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, has pointed out that "the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) provides that everyone has the right 'to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.' . . . States must take steps to reduce the stillbirth and infant mortality rate, and ensure the healthy development of the child; they must take steps to improve environmental health, to prevent, treat and control endemic and epidemic disease, and to ensure that medical services are available to the sick." Similarly, "[t]he Convention on the Rights of the Child (CROC) . . . is . . . explicit about health, spelling out children's right to the highest attainable standards of health and to facilities for the treatment of illness. It specifically mentions infant and child mortality, post-natal health care, health education and preventative health." M. Dodson, "Linking International Standards With Contemporary Concerns of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples," in Pritchard, *Indigenous Peoples*, 23–24.
 67. M. A. Brady, S. J. Kunitz, and D. Nash, "WHO's Definition? Australian Aborigines, Conceptualisations of Health, and the World Health Organization," in *Migrants, Minorities, and Health: Historical and Contemporary Studies*, ed. L. Marks and M. Worboys (London, England: Routledge, 1997).
 68. Rabben, *Unnatural Selection*, 49.
 69. R. Paine, "Ethnodrama and the 'Fourth World': The Saami Action Group in Norway, 1979–1981," in *Indigenous Peoples and the Nation-State: Fourth World Politics in Canada, Australia and Norway*, ed. N. Dyck (St. John's, Newfoundland, Canada: Memorial University of Newfoundland, Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1985), 190–235.
 70. M. Dodson, "Linking International Standards," 19.
 71. R. Nader and L. Wallach, "GATT, NAFTA, and the Subversion of the Democratic Process," in *The Case Against the Global Economy and for a Turn Toward the Local*, ed. J. Mander and E. Goldsmith (San Francisco, Calif: Sierra Club Books, 1996).
 72. Z. Bauman, *Globalization: The Human Consequences* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1998), 68.
 73. R. Nisbet, *The Sociological Tradition* (New York, NY: Basic Books, Inc, 1966).